Olson (1993) ‘s seminal ’Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’ provides a convincing account for the emergence of both autocratic and democratic governance, only relying on self-interested actors. However, is it a comprehensive account? I believe that it leaves out two key phenomena, rendering them either unexplained (dynasties) or epiphenomena (nationalism). However, the ubiquity of both suggests they are fundamental.
In Olson’s account, raw self -interest drives the development of governance from anarchy –> autocracy –> democracy under certain circumstances (none of the steps are assured). The power of his framework is its parsimony, and he acknowledges that it smooths over many important factors. However, pure self-interest do not account for two factors deeply embedded in the modern nation state: one, dynasties and two, national identity / national ism .
Olson does not discuss nationalism per se , however he does note that dynasties are a means for extending the ‘life’ of a monarch. Unstated however is why the self is extended to children. Assumedly, there is a ‘self-ish gene’ (Dawkins 1976) argument. However, this is a substantial expansion of the ‘self’, one which supports a quite broad account of kin-based altruism (Kay, Keller, and Lehmann 2020; Green et al. 2024) , which may extend to ‘fictive kinship’ (Qirko 2011) . That is, once one allows for the ‘self’ to be a manipulable perception of connectedness (no king could actually do a DNA test historically), the ability to extend the human self becomes quite broad.
If Olson’s account admits some degree of unselfish behavior (meaning literally beyond the self) and towards a broader genetic group (kin), we can ask what the mechanism is. The evolutionary biology literature suggests that the degree of kin perception moderates the extension of self-interest. That is, humans are altruistic because they incorporate others utility functions into their own as a function of the their relatedness . Hamilton’s rule from evolutionary biology predicts altruistic behavior whenever the fitness ‘sacrifice’ increases the fitness of another relative to their shared genetic heritage ( \(rB > C\) , where \(r\) is genetic similarity between actor and recipient, \(B\) is fitness benefit to the recipient, and \(C\) is fitness cost to the actor. The basis of altruism in perceived kinship has been durable and ‘serially re-discovered’ finding within evolutionary biology (Kay, Keller, and Lehmann 2020) and it is apparent from even the lowest rungs (non-thinking) of the tree of life (Green et al. 2024) .
If perceived shared kinship is the basis for dynastic altruism, we can assume this applies to the population also . If so, this is the most likely explanation for the rise of the nation state . Nation-states ‘extend’ the kinship group to a wider identity, in which utilities are inter-dependent. This notion is derived from Anderson (1983) ‘s ’imagined communities’, in which the modern nation imagines themselves to be part of a collective. Anderson points to shared media and common movement through central institutions (universities, governments) in state and regional capitals While not explicitly kin, a nation state may be an alternate vehicle for fictive kinship (Qirko 2011) and shared fate (Dawson 1995) . Alesina, Reich, and Riboni (2020) argues that a positive nationalism is used for just this purpose – to create a broad group in which people will desire the provision of public, rather than selective, goods. This allows for the efficient recruitment of soldiers. To the extent that the nation is seen as an extension of the family, this perception would increase the provision of public goods, as the population’s benefit can be derived from both their own and others benefits within the national community. This may be a virtuous cycle, as the altruistic provision and enjoyment of public goods across the national population reinforces feelings of fictive kinship. A key hypothesis I am interested to test is whether altruistic action causes perceptions of shared kinship (rather than the reverse, kinship –> altruism).
Olson’s account explains democracy, but the ubiquity of both dynasties and nationalism cannot be easily explained. The introduction of perceived kinship as the building block of altruism allows for an explanation, in which collective good provision is further incentivized by the incorporation of kin (dynasty) or the nation (ethnic-nationalism being more proximate to kinship than or civic-nationalism, which may be more fictive kinship (Qirko 2011) ).
P.S. Another unaddressed point, that seemed separate enough to discuss elsewhere, is the creation of the idea of a divine ‘monarchy’. The notion of a monarchy and legitimacy itself is an extra-rational notion, which requires moral ideas (someone should rule for X or Y reason). This speaks to Bowles (2016) ‘s argument about morality being deeply intertwined in economics. If Olson’s account was correct, populations should know that the state is a stationary bandit, so there would be no need for monarchy to legitimate itself morally (they could be worshipped without claiming the legitimacy of that worship – in fact, many gods may be worshipped out of fear rather than morality per se. The notion that capital-G God is ’good’ and ‘legitimate’ is, at least partially, a newer advancement, insofar as there were multiple gods with different characteristics and suitabilities in the past. So, while Socrates may as ‘what pleases the gods’, it is not clear that any single one was ‘legitimate’ or a sole ‘ruler’… certainly, they were at least fallible.. )